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InTROduCTIOn
democracy – real democracy – remains to be constructed. 
And we will do so in an orderly society – a truly orderly society.1
The trials of nazi collaborators, which took place after the liberation of Paris 
from the grips of occupants, proved it necessary to redefine the definitions 
of primary values such as freedom, justice and equality. As Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty noticed, people who collaborated with the nazi camp were pro-
claimed “traitors” not by means of criteria which could be set objectively, 
but due to the fact that the resistance movement had won.2 in an alterna-
tive course of events, they would have been introduced as heroes, whose 
heroic attitude would have been inscribed on the pages of history forever. 
This shows only the evanescence of ideals, which can be easily manipu-
lated when considered in the context of one prevailing concept. Czesław 
Miłosz in The Captive Mind captured this process most accurately. The 
writer managed to pinpoint the strength with which one dominant thought 
1 A. Camus, the editorial of september 2nd, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947, trans. 
A goldhammer, ed. J. Levi-valensi, Princeton and oxford, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 27.
2 see: M. Merleau-Ponty, Humanizm i terror, trans. J. Migasiński [in:] Marksizm XX wieku: anto-
logia tekstów, cz. 1–3, ed. J. dobieszewski, M.J. siemek, warszawa, wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
warszawskiego, 1990.
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infiltrated the considerations of many minds of the post-war intellectual 
world. He also pointed out the consequences that occurred in the wake of 
the fleeting blindness which affected people’s view of reality and impaired 
their ability to look critically at events.3 even among the most sapient minds, 
the lack of unambiguous definitions of fundamental categories entails the 
danger of becoming lost when faced with the need for decision-making, 
and uttering distinct and unpopular judgments. However, events which 
took place in post-occupation France showed that the discourse regarding 
intuitively comprehended values gains significance when standing on the 
verge of inevitable fatalism.
The liberation became an impulse to discuss the fate of collaborators who, 
during the second world war, did not cooperate with enemies actively, 
but encouraged such cooperation or criticized the state of vichy for its 
passive participation in creating state politics.4 such collaborators often 
provided arguments for the ultimate and official alliance with the aggres-
sor. Among these collaborators were those who were known and acknowl-
edged in the public eye and had a major impact on opinions within French 
society. Making use of their position, they tried to persuade as many people 
as possible to agree with their beliefs and, as a result, to weaken the influ-
ence of the resistance movement on the society. such actions, however, in 
reference to the French Penal Code, which was officially valid at that time, 
could not be acknowledged as treason and qualified as a crime. The 75th 
article which regulated that issue defined particular premises of crimi-
nal liability, i.e. bearing arms against France, maintaining relations with 
a foreign power, committing to undertake hostilities against France, pro-
viding means to facilitate the entry of foreign forces into French territory, 
entering the service of a foreign power, and maintaining relations with 
a foreign power in order to encourage actions of this power against France.5 
The lack of a premise which would allow people who were guilty of support-
ing the policy of occupants to be criminally responsible led to an extension 
in the interpretation of the phrase “maintaining relations with a foreign 
power.” strong voices were heard arguing that pro-nazi agitation was also 
eligible to be qualified as a crime due to the contest of the article mentioned 
3 see: Cz. Miłosz, Zniewolony umysł, Kraków, KAw, 1990.
4 see: T. Judt, Historia niedokończona. Francuscy intelektualiści 1944–1956, trans. P. Marczewski, 
warszawa, Krytyka Polityczna, 2012.
5 The full text of the article is available at: http://www.cdvfe-divisioncharlemagne.com/upload/
Article%2075.pdf [access: 22.09.2015].
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before, even though an explicit base did not exist. such an understanding 
of the article would have enabled as many supporters of the Third Reich as 
possible to be held criminally responsible, without the need for adjusting 
the law6 (which nota bene would not have been possible without breaching 
one of the most important elements of the rule of law: that law must not 
be applied retroactively, i.e. it is wrong to judge actions which happened 
before the law was enacted7).
The problem was the justification of many trials which relied on an 
ambigu ous and equivocal legal basis. it raised doubts regarding the exist-
ence of the ideals of the rule of law, which the French Republic after the 
war was supposed to respect. The purge trials were conducted promptly, 
often without allowing witnesses to testify or evidence to be presented. 
The accused were also often sentenced to death.8 The purges brought about 
a division among prominent French intellectuals into two camps: those who 
raised critical questions about the trials and those who provided arguments 
for the endorsement of the trials. The head of the first group was Francois 
Mauriac, who tried to remind Le Figaro’s readers of the issue of mercy. 
The second group was led by Albert Camus, who referred in the editorials 
of Combat9 to the issue of justice as the ground for the justification of the 
controversial trials.10
in this essay, only the Combat editorials which relate to the problem of 
justice will be taken into account. Combat was a newspaper established by 
the United Movements of Resistance, and Camus was the editor-in-chief in 
the period of 1944–1947.11 we will attempt to unveil how Camus harnessed 
the concept of justice in order to justify the purge trials, and how the ambi-
guity of justice resulted in difficulties when considered in relation to the 
problem of the purges. The reasoning will lead us to the significant concept 
6 see: T. Judt, Powojnie. Historia Europy od roku 1945, trans. R. Bartołd, Poznań, Rebis, 2013, 
p. 59–65.
7 see: L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law: Revised Edition, new Haven–London, Yale University Press, 
1964, p. 51–63.
8 see: T. Judt, Historia niedokończona..., p. 67.
9 it is worth noting that even if Camus wasn’t the direct author of some of the editorials, he had 
a major impact on creating them – the editorials were at first profoundly discussed by the whole 
editorial board of Combat (which nota bene were composed only of Camus, Henri Frederic, Albert 
olliver and Pascal Pia) and published exclusively if each member accepted them (see: o. Todd, 
Albert Camus. Biografia, trans. J. Kortas, warszawa, wydawnictwo w.A.B., 2009, p. 375).
10 see: R. drai, Camus i Mauriac. Spór o miłosierdzie, trans. s. Kowalski, „gazeta wyborcza”, 9th 
August 2014.
11 see: J. Levi-valensi, Introduction [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, p. xxxi.
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of revolution provided by Camus. subsequently, The Just Assassins will be 
taken into consideration to provide us with deep insight into the relationship 
between justice and terror. Finally, the set of editorials titled Neither Victims 
nor Executioners will be discussed in regard to Camus’s answers to the issues 
raised before. our thesis is as follows: Camus sees the way out of the con-
tradiction resulting from the concept of justice as provided in the Combat 
editorials in the rejection of the ideological thinking leading to absolutiza-
tion of justice.
juSTICE And REVOluTIOn
As Camus wrote in september 1944: “The difficult and prodigious task we 
face is to establish justice in the most unjust of worlds.”12 This is just one of 
many claims from the beginning of the post-occupation purge. He referred 
to the idea of justice as the most desired value needed for the foundation of 
the restoration process in France. in the same editorial, Camus explained 
how justice can be understood: “Justice for all means that the personality 
of the individual must be subordinated to the collective good.”13 Later on, 
he added: “whenever we deal with a social issue, we need to think about 
the individual, and whenever the individual claims our attention, we need 
to consider the good of all.”14 Camus believed that social order required 
equilibrium between the government and the people it governed. And this 
harmony could be achieved on the basis of justice. As he put it directly: 
“There is no order without justice, and the ideal order lies in the happi-
ness of people.”15
For Camus, the common good demanded vengeance for the victims of 
the occupation. Their death was brought about by people, many of whom 
remained unpunished after the liberation. However, such a lack of com-
pensation leads directly to the division of the society into those whose rel-
atives have not been avenged and those whose actions have led to the death 
of others. in Camus’s eyes, such a situation immediately causes the rise of 
hatred. in the long term it would also lead to the destabilization of the whole 
12 Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, p. 257.
13 A. Camus, the editorial of september 8th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, p. 31.
14 ibidem, p. 32.
15 A. Camus, the editorial of october 12th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 69.
does justice Require Victims? Reflections on Albert Camus’s Thought 179
nation. Therefore, in order to avoid internal disintegration, the society must 
face the problem of the embodiment of justice in the post-liberation system. 
in this context, Camus says:
we know full well that on the day the first death sentence is carried out in 
Paris, we will feel repugnance. At that moment we will need to remember the 
countless other death sentences imposed on men who were pure and will have 
to recall so many cherished faces now buried in the ground and so many hands 
we once loved to shake.16
Moreover, Camus had a negative opinion on the issue of divine justice. To 
put it simply, he claimed that there was no faith in divine justice anymore. 
Consequently, people have to turn themselves to human justice “with its ter-
rible imperfections.”17 one of the negative sides of human justice is the neces-
sity of making choices and accepting the consequences of one’s decisions. in 
the age of war, a human being becomes an arbiter and faces all the difficul-
ties entailed by the new role. otherwise, depending only on divine justice, 
society would not be able to rid itself of postwar dilemmas. As Camus says: 
“one doesn’t have to be a Christian to believe that sacrifices for justice are 
necessary.”18 He adds in the same editorial:
we invite Mr. Mauriac to consider the dilemma of those to whom the notion 
of divine judgment is foreign yet who retain a taste for man and hope for its 
grandeur. They must either hold their peace forever or become converts to 
human justice. This cannot take place without distress. But after four years 
of collective suffering in the wake of twenty-five years of mediocrity, doubt 
is no longer possible. And we have chosen to embrace human justice with its 
terrible imperfections.19
The principle of justice is therefore coupled with the problem of responsibility, 
which can be considered at two levels. The first one is related to the respon-
sibility of the judges, the second one refers to the criminals who committed 
16 A. Camus, the editorial of october 21th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 82.
17 A. Camus, the editorial of october 25th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 90.
18 A. Camus, the editorial of october 25th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 89.
19 Ibidem.
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crimes during the war. when it comes to the latter, the responsibility of 
wrongdoers, Camus relates it to the concept of “proportional responsibility.” 
Responsibility did not concern only evident acts from the people criminally 
liable under the 75th article of the French Penal Code that was binding after 
the second world war. Those who contributed indirectly to the criminal acts, 
such as industrialists and opinion-makers, were also considered responsi-
ble. That is why, according to Camus, an amendment of the Penal Code was 
needed. The crimes of the prominent politicians of the vichy regime could 
be judged on the basis of the 75th article which determined that people who 
collaborated with the enemy should be judged. However, the post-liberation 
dilemma applied mostly to people who could not be judged on the grounds 
of this article, for example journalists or writers, whose fault had been to per-
suade others to collaborate with the nazi occupants. For this reason, Camus 
postulated introducing a new type of crime: “consorting with the enemy,”20 
that would have had retroactive power. However, such a type of crime would 
have made the law unpredictable and vulnerable to change by the ruling 
regime. Camus seemed to recognize this problem when stating:
The notion of “consorting with the enemy” is useful. or, rather, it must be put 
to use. Furthermore, if it is indeed the case that the application of this higher 
moral law involves the assertion of principles of punishment incompatible with 
the spirit of democracy, a corrective is nevertheless available.21 
we come therefore to the first type of responsibility – responsibility of the 
judges of the actions from the occupation period. To consider this issue, we 
will appeal to the concept of revolution, as delivered by Camus. According 
to him – from the period of the Combat editorials – revolution is the use 
of force against the life of individuals in order to embody justice in reality. 
Camus wrote:
nor can we forget that in both cases the lives of Frenchmen are at stake: the 
best of us will have to die in the war, and we will have to destroy the worst of 
us in the revolution.22
20 A. Camus, the editorial of september 28th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 50.
21 A. Camus, the editorial of october 18th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 77.
22 A. Camus, the editorial of october 21th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 82.
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And also:
Regardless of our desires and reactions, there can be no doubt that France 
has a revolution to make as well as a war. That is indeed the drama it faces.23
Revolution therefore is a tool held in the hands of the guards of the new order. 
it is the necessary step towards the restoration of social harmony. As was 
shown before, in Camus’s eyes, justice demands vengeance for the pointless 
deaths of many victims. And revolution is the tool to cope with this issue. 
For Camus, revolution is inevitable for the same reason as in the case of war. 
Revolution is just the necessary corollary of the actions of people from the 
period of occupation, which enables sins to be judged. it helps with the resto-
ration of social order, trust and the authority of the new power. weaknesses 
will not pass unnoticed. Responsibility should be taken even after consider-
ing the fact that the choices were made in the extreme circumstance of occu-
pation. Revolution is also the tool to restore the spirit of the nation, which 
will not break again under the influence of external forces. And, ultimately, 
revolution makes it possible to face hesitations that inevitably arise after each 
conflict, stifling the society.
we cannot escape from this drama by evading the question it raises. we can 
escape only by enduring it to the bitter end and drawing from it whatever 
truth it contains.24
Revolution therefore strengthens bonds between members of the society. it 
enables a sense of security to be restored and harm to be redressed, building 
grounds for a liberated society. it is the tool embodying the pure concept of 
justice in the real world.
one of the problems with the concept of revolution is that revolution does 
not have to be legal. Camus says this explicitly. By postulating the post factum 
amendment of the law, he falls into a trap, which, when recognized, leads to 
his later reconsiderations. The winners of the war are allowed to build the 
post-conflict order on their own and no one is strong enough to stand up 
against them. And they can do it on behalf of justice. They are allowed to judge 
anyone anytime they find necessary, even if they have no grounds in the law 
23 A. Camus, the editorial of october 20th, 1944 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 81.
24 Ibidem.
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to do this. such actions are allowed therefore to be arbitrary and judges are 
permitted to sentence anyone to death or to prison, if they find it beneficial 
for social order. Actions that are performed on behalf of justice are justified. 
The post-Hobbesian question remains: what is the difference between a state 
in which the winners are in control of other people’s lives and a state of war?
The other problem with the concept of revolution in the shape that Camus 
provides is that the post-war time is defined by disorder. There are no new 
institutions created yet. it is hard to find judges whose opinions would not 
have been distorted by an occupation that caused emotional biases and who 
would consequently be able to defend themselves against the pressure imposed 
on them by the divided society. society wants a quick punishment and that 
is the perfect field for abuse. People who were victims during the war, now 
turn into the judges of those who hurt them or their relatives. war provides 
two categories of people: occupants and victims. But when victims win the 
war, they get the power to judge the occupants. And if their means are unre-
stricted, then this can cause an overuse of power. Therefore, the revolution 
that was supposed to be carried out on behalf of justice can become an alibi 
for new tyrants.
Thus, starting with justice, Camus comes to the idea against which he fights 
shortly afterwards: that the pure concept of justice requires the division of 
the world into two categories and can provide justification for violence. This 
is what happened in France after the occupation: trials from the purge period 
were conducted promptly and often without allowing evidence or witnes-
ses.25 Their legal base was the amendment to the Penal Code implemented 
after the liberation, which was retroactively binding. The guilt of the collab-
orators was therefore often prejudged. This made the trials far from just, if 
justice is understood in terms of the rule of law. The concept of revolution 
that Camus provided, which was supposed to be applied in the context of the 
purges, leads to the idea of the division of society into two opposite camps 
and to the justification of the use of violence. very promptly, however, Camus 
recognizes the failure of the purges:
we beg the reader’s indulgence if we begin today with a basic fact: there can no 
longer be any doubt that the postwar purge has not only failed in France but 
is now completely discredited. The word “purge” itself was already rather dis-
tressing. […] it seems that the straight path of justice is not easy to find amid 
25 see: T. Judt, Powojnie..., p. 59–65.
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the cries of hatred coming from one side and special pleading of guilty con-
sciences coming from the other. in any case, the failure is complete.26
Camus had to deal with this issue of the purge trails on three different levels: 
(1) the issue of people who committed war crimes; (2) the issue of people who 
committed treason, but were acting according to the law as the authorities of 
the vichy state; and (3) the issue of people who were urging others to leave the 
values of pre-war France and to turn towards nazi occupants. And he seems to 
be aware of the complexity of this issue. The government officials of the vichy 
regime tried to present themselves as heroes who were protecting the home-
land. Their actions were not supposed to be considered as collaboration with 
the enemy, but as an appeal to the instinct of self-preservation.27 The attempt 
of reconciling two different attitudes was not successful either for the left or 
for the right side. in this context, it is worth mentioning the case of Robert 
Brasillach – a critic of the government of vichy, who was a well-known and 
respected writer in France at that time and an editor-in-chief of the pro-fas-
cist magazine Je suis partout. on the pages of the magazine, he preached the 
need to transform cooperation with the nazis into “a level of social friend-
ship.”28 He criticized the government for the lack of involvement in rebuilding 
the grandeur of France in accordance with the nazi ideology and for throw-
ing France into the arms of Bolshevism.29 The trials of such people resonated 
strongly in intellectuals’ minds after the war and polarized society. A good 
illustration of this division was the petition in favor of mercy for Brasillach, 
who was sentenced to death before evidence was provided during the trial. 
More importantly for us, Camus eventually signed the petition. However, in 
a letter to Marcel Ayme, he explained that his reasons for doing so were related 
to his moral turn against the concept of the capital punishment.30
Camus’s primary faith in justice, as expressed in early Combat editorials, 
was seriously reconsidered, leading the author to divide society into two cat-
egories: people who were allowed to make executions and those who could 
26 A. Camus, the editorial of August 30th, 1945 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 249–250.
27 see: P. Klamann, Między realizmem a oportunizmem. Rzecz o Francji Vichy, „Folia Historica Cra-
coviensia” 2012, no. Xviii, p. 310. see: R.o. Praxton, Francja Vichy. Stara gwardia i nowy ład 
1940–1944, trans. J. Lang, wrocław, Bukowy Las, 2011.
28 J. Bartyzel, Robert Brasillach, http://www.legitymizm.org/ebp-robert-brasilach [access: 11.01.2015].
29 see: ibidem.
30 see: T. Judt, Brzemię odpowiedzialności. Blum, Camus, Aron i francuski wiek dwudziesty, trans. 
M. Filipczuk, warszawa, Krytyka Polityczna, 2013, p. 146.
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be judged out of the law system. The reason for this was war, which brutally 
destroyed the order of the nation. And defending the trials led Camus to the 
justification of violence. Having realized the consequences and the coher-
ence between his former propositions and the effects of the purge, however, 
he confessed his aberration very quickly and put all his effort into pointing 
out the mistakes he had made in his previous reasoning.
juSTICE And TERROR
– with whom to talk about murder if not with a murderer?
– what murder? i remind myself only of an act of justice.31
The concept of the justification of violence occurs throughout Camus’s later 
work. Mark orme, the author of a detailed analysis of Camus’s concept of 
justice, asserts even that the experience of the purge trials was a turning point 
in the writer’s life, without which there would be no Camus that we know 
now.32 The thesis can be disputed – we need to remember that Camus took 
his stand in the dispute on the purge trials after having written Caligula, The 
Myth of Sisyphus and The Stranger, in all of which he tried to develop his own 
attitude to the crucial problem of the death of a single man. it was however 
in 1949, in the play titled The Just Assassins, where the writer dealt directly 
with the issue of the mechanism at the foundation of the legitimization of 
murder. For the purpose of this essay, the play is especially interesting for two 
reasons: firstly, there is much dispute concerning the meaning of the play, 
and secondly, it depicts many ways in which violence could be justified, but 
ultimately rejects all of them.
in The Just Assassins, Camus portrays a group of young people who decide 
to murder the grand duke for a higher purpose, i.e. in order to liberate the 
whole of society from the power of tyranny.33 in the name of freedom they 
decide to kill their ruler, and this action is subsequently supposed to bring 
prosperity to the next generations. However, many more justifications for their 
31 “– Z kim mówić o zbrodni, jeśli nie ze zbrodniarzem? – Jakiej zbrodni? Przypominam sobie tylko 
akt sprawiedliwości.” A. Camus, Sprawiedliwi, trans. J. Błoński [in:] A. Camus, Dramaty, trans. 
w. natanson, M. Leśniewska, w. Błońska, J. Błoński, Kraków, wydawnictwo Literackie, 1987, 
p. 274. All the quotes which appear in the essay were translated by the author.
32 see: M. orme, The Development of Albert Camus’ Concern for Social and Political Justice, Madison 
and Teaneck, Fairleigh dickinson University Press, 2007, p. 127–152.
33 A. Camus, Sprawiedliwi…, p. 229.
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deed emerge from the pages of The Just Assassins. For Kaliayev, taking the 
life of the despotic ruler seems to be the only possible way that would allow 
a world where “no one would ever kill”34 to arise. His romantic soul longs for 
beauty and joy, which can be embodied exclusively in a society deprived of 
violence. He understands revolution, therefore, in the way that it is an action 
carried out due to the faith in the opportunity to realize the vision of a just 
world in which no unjustified death would occur:35
i am preparing the revolution, because i love life. (...) The revolution for life 
in order to give it a chance. (...) Besides, we are killing to build the world.36
Annenkov – Kaliayev’s companion – decides to take part in the assassina-
tion due to his belief in the possibility of liberating society from the power 
of the tyrant. He is a sensitive man of honor, who regards the temporary 
violence solely as a means to prevent any future terror.37 dora – Kaliayev’s 
beloved – perceives murder as a terrifying necessity imposed by the demand 
for justice. she believes that the death penalty which will be later imposed 
on the perpetrator provides absolution for the sin. death suffered on behalf 
of fulfilling one’s beliefs means that the murderers who died for their ideas 
will arise as heroes:
To perform the attack and then to go to the gallows – it’s giving your life twice. 
we will pay more than we owe.38
dora seems to recognize the evil to which she and her colleagues contrib-
ute, but her feeling appears to be blurred by the conviction that one day, evil 
itself will disappear. in the world surrounding the revolutionaries there is 
no place for such emotions as mercy or love – justice has engulfed them all, 
demanding full dedication and commitment.39
vojnov – another of Kaliayev’s companions – perceives the justification for 
murdering the grand duke in taking the decision to renounce lies. Justice 
34 Ibidem, p. 238.
35 Ibidem.
36 “dlatego przygotowuję rewolucję, że kocham życie. (...) Rewolucja dla życia, aby dać życiu szansę. 
(...) A zresztą zabijamy, żeby budować świat.” Ibidem, p. 236–238.
37 Ibidem, p. 229.
38 “Ale dokonać zamachu, a później iść na szubienicę, to oddać życie dwa razy. Zapłacimy więcej 
niż jesteśmy winni.” Ibidem, p. 239.
39 Ibidem, p. 259.
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needs words – silence is exclusively another way of bearing the responsibility 
for injustice.40 The sole means which can lead to liberation from this dilemma 
is an open fight, justified by one’s beliefs. That is the only way to live in coher-
ence with one’s conscience, dictating the moral obligation of resisting evil.41 
such a position is essentially different from the attitude of stepan, for whom 
the highest justification of murder is the idea of revolution itself.42 For him, 
the sacrifice of life is pointless, because one loses the chance to devote oneself 
to the revolution in the future.43 Absolute justice requires obedience rather 
than exalted attitudes (which may lead solely to a stupor in the face of the 
need for real action44):
i don’t love life but justice, which is above life. (...) i came here to kill the man, 
not to love him or respect his distinctiveness.45
The fight with tyranny requires toughness – only then can it be accomplished 
with success.46 Thereby, according to stepan, everything which serves the rev-
olution is allowed. stepan feels responsible not just for the freedom of society 
in general but also for the freedom of each man separately, which positions 
him beyond all moral principles.47 in a world where god is dead, someone has 
to take god’s duties on their shoulders. Although not a ruler-tyrant, justice 
has to be given to someone who feels strong enough for this task:
For us who don’t believe in god, there’s no choice: either full justice or despair.48
However, in the face of human feelings and hesitations, the revolutionaries 
prove to be powerless. The perseverance of their ideals is examined when they 
reach the inevitable adversities. Kaliayev requires an explicit order to be given 
in order to gain the strength to overcome them and to regain moral compo-
sure, getting rid of the dilemma concerning the responsibility for his actions. 
40 Ibidem, p. 232.
41 Ibidem.
42 Ibidem, p. 251.
43 Ibidem, p. 236.
44 Ibidem.
45 “Ja nie kocham życia, ale sprawiedliwość, która jest ponad życiem. […] Przyszedłem tu, aby zabić 
człowieka, nie po to, by go kochać czy uszanować jego odrębność.” Ibidem.
46 Ibidem, p. 248.
47 Ibidem, p. 250.
48 “dla nas, niewierzących w Boga, nie ma wyboru: albo pełna sprawiedliwość albo rozpacz.” Ibidem, 
p. 263.
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Annenkov recalls the principles of honor, which would aid him as a leader 
drawing an unambiguous line between morally right and wrong actions. 
dora demands love in order to sacrifice her life to the revolution ultimately. 
The impulse forcing her to such devotion is the death of beloved Kaliayev, 
which results in the idea of perfect victory justifying the committed murder 
and prompting her to volunteer for another terrorist act.
According to some critics, Camus in The Just Assassins allows murder to be 
justified under certain conditions which all need to be fulfilled. John Foley, in 
his recent book addressing the issue, lists them all: (1) the victim is a tyrant; 
(2) the act must be discriminate; (3) the assassination is committed by a rebel 
in close proximity to his victim and the assassin must accept full responsibil-
ity for his individual action; (4) there is no less violent alternative to assassin-
ation.49 it remains unnoticed, however, that the justification of murder can 
be considered at two different levels: the first one is the murder of a tyrant 
and the second one – the murder of a human. despite the fact that killing 
the tyrant seems to become legitimate under some conditions, it automati-
cally entails taking the life of a single man and, when perceiving the issue in 
compliance with Camus, justification for such an aspect of liberation from 
tyranny can never be provided. The death of an unjust ruler causes the death 
of a husband, a father and a friend as well.50 “Murderers don’t know about 
that. if they knew, how could they inflict death?,”51 the grand duchess asks 
in her final dialogue with Kaliayev. The bomb thrown at tyranny also implies 
the death of a single human, which seems to be expressed by Camus in the 
play. And when we forget about this, we can describe ourselves as already 
lost and subordinated solely to our theoretical considerations.
Compelling is the scene when Kaliayev meets Foka – a prisoner who hangs 
convicts based on orders that have been issued to him. However, when Kaliayev 
calls him explicitly “an executioner,”52 Foka’s answer appears quickly: “But 
aren’t you one as well?”53 The same concept is manifested in the conversa-
tion with skouratov – a member of the secret police who visits Kaliayev 
in prison. “The bomb wasn’t thrown by me at the man, but at tyr anny,”54 
Kaliayev insists. “You shouldn’t pretend that you forgot about the head of 
the grand duke. But if you had taken it into account, your idea wouldn’t 
49 see: J. Foley, From the Absurd to Revolt, stocksfield, Acumen, 2008, p. 93–96.
50 see: A. Camus, Sprawiedliwi…, p. 274.
51 Ibidem.
52 “To ty jesteś katem?” Ibidem, p. 269.
53 “A ty, barin, to nie?” Ibidem
54 “Bombę rzuciłem nie na człowieka, ale na tyranię.” Ibidem, p. 271.
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have been useful. For instance, what you have done would bring disgust not 
pride,”55 skouratov notes.
Camus asserts that any idea (including the idea of justice) can justify the 
murder of a man. The grand duchess recalls the grand duke sleeping in 
his armchair two hours before the assassination. “Many things die with one 
man,”56 she notes. He wasn’t only a tyrant, but also a man, whom his rela-
tives needed, who was giving support and who had his own habits. The revo-
lutionaries backed away from the murder of children, drawing here a clear 
line for their actions. But one question was raised by Camus’s character: “if 
the idea cannot kill a child, is it worth killing the grand duke?”57 There is no 
difference between these two types of homicide. no matter if one victim is 
a child and the other not – both are humans. A murder committed on a des-
potic ruler for the sake of the liberation of society remains always a violent 
act performed against someone. Therefore, it cannot be justified.
it has to be underlined that Kaliayev did not abandon his task easily, still 
being ready to sacrifice children in order to implement the pure idea into 
reality:
Here’s what i propose. if you decide the children have to be killed, i’ll wait 
outside and throw the bomb alone. i know i won’t miss. Just make the deci-
sion, i’ll be obedient to the organization.58
so was stepan, who gave the most extreme arguments and had the most rev-
olutionary attitude. dora, in turn, took into account the authority and influ-
ence of the organization which could be lost.59 For Annenkov, the death of 
children was simply unnecessary.60 one issue, however, remained forgotten 
by the revolutionaries: the murder of children would contradict the rule of 
justice, on behalf of which they committed their actions. if one draws a strict 
border between permissible and impermissible murder and distinguishes 
55 “(...) nie powinien pan udawać. Udawać, że zapomniał pan o głowie wielkiego księcia. gdyby 
wziął ją pan pod uwagę, na nic by się panu nie przydała idea. Tak na przykład to, co pan zrobił, 
budziłoby w panu nie dumę, ale wstyd.” Ibidem, p. 272.
56 “wiele rzeczy umiera wraz z jednym człowiekiem.” Ibidem, p. 274.
57 “nasuwa się więc pytanie: jeśli idea nie potrafi zabić dziecka, czy zasługuje na to, a by zabić dla 
niej wielkiego księcia?” Ibidem, p. 273.
58 “oto, co proponuję. Jeśli postanowicie, że te dzieci mają zginąć, zaczekam przy wyjściu i rzucę 
bombę sam. wiem, że nie chybię. Postanówcie tylko, będę posłuszny organizacji.” Ibidem, p. 246.
59 Ibidem, p. 248.
60 Ibidem, p. 251.
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one from the other, the existence of the justification of “permissible” violence 
must be admitted.
such a conclusion offers a substantial insight into Camus’s thought: he finds 
himself far from the condemnation of murder in general, but his ambition 
is to disclose the contradiction contained in the considerations and actions 
of the revolutionaries. The author does not aim to create a tone of moral 
correctness, but to draw the reader’s attention to the obvious fact: placing 
any theoretical idea at the beginning of one’s deliberations can lead to con-
tradictory conclusions. The revolutionaries could have been right about the 
permissibility of the homicide of the grand duke, but they only considered 
it at an abstract level – when implemented in reality, it came down to the 
obvious, physical act of killing a specific man, which can never be morally 
justifiable. However, it needs to be underlined that Camus seems to believe 
that murder is not always unambiguously morally wrong – nonetheless, it is 
in each case one-sided, which results in rejecting the possibility to provide 
justification for killing – even for an exceptional one. otherwise, a protest 
against violence would end up violently as well. The question could be raised, 
however, whether a murder, even if not justified, can be in some instances 
inevitable. And to this dilemma Camus seems to answer positively. But this 
issue requires a completely distinct deliberation.61
VICTIm And ExECuTIOnER
i would never count myself among people of whatever stripe who are willing to 
countenance murder.62
Any attempt to accept certain acts of permissible killing ends up in failure. 
Justice comprehended abstractly requires advocating one of two sides: victims 
or executioners. nevertheless, there is a considerable remedy to be given and 
Camus provides it explicitly in his set of essays titled Neither Victims nor Exe-
cutioners. The essays appeared in Combat before The Just Assassins was pub-
lished, but they can be considered as an answer to the problems identified 
in the play. such a view seems to be questionable, but grounds for it can be 
seen when perceiving The Just Assassins as an endeavor to look closer at the 
61 For deliberations on the inevitability of murder in Camus’ thinking see: J. Foley, op.cit., p. 96–100.
62 A. Camus, the editorial of november 30th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947..., 
p. 274.
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pure mechanism of reaching the intellectual allowance for killing and at the 
dilemmas which accompany it. only then does it appear that Camus, in The 
Just Assassins, set his goal in taking into consideration different ways of pos-
sible justification, instead of focusing on giving an answer to the basic ques-
tion: do actions completed on behalf of justice always require the occurrence 
of executioners and victims, as was the case during the purge trials and in 
the situation presented in The Just Assassins? in order to take a stance, thus, 
some of Camus’s arguments and assertions from Neither Victims nor Execu-
tioners need to be presented:
1. Murder can never be legitimized.63 Camus claims that if one rejects 
that fact, he or she must inevitably agree to replace one form of terror 
with another. only by refusing the legitimization for the justification 
of violence would it be possible to “create the conditions for a just phi-
losophy and for a provisional accord among those of us unwilling to 
be either victims or executioners.”64
2. There is no way of persuading the representative of an ideology,65 i.e. 
someone who is filled with ideological ideas will not be able to look 
critically at his standpoint. “in order to escape from this terror, we 
need to be able to think and to act on the basis of our thoughts,”66 
Camus asserts.
3. The end can never justify the means.67 Another attitude leads directly 
to implementing nihilism into the world. However, it is important to 
note that giving unprecedented priority to moral issues is also an end 
that cannot be justified by any means.68
4. The idea of a unified world order cannot be implemented without 
war,69 i.e. each attempt to embody an order based on any value leads to 
failure – it entails murder, which is then legitimized by the value itself. 
According to Camus, such a situation can never take place. Murder 
cannot be justified.
63 A. Camus, the editorial of november 20th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
s. 260.
64 Ibidem, p. 261.
65 A. Camus, the editorial of november 19th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 258.
66 Ibidem, p. 259.
67 A. Camus, the editorial of november 21th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 262.
68 Ibidem, p. 263.
69 A. Camus, the editorial of november 26th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 267.
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5. A world order must be based on dialogue.70 For Camus, the dialogue 
is a state in which no value has been given a superior merit. only then is 
it possible to open one’s mind to the diversity of the world of morality.
Absolute justice requires an affirming answer to the following basic questions: 
“Yes or no, directly or indirectly, do you want to be killed and assaulted? Yes 
or no, directly or indirectly, do you want to kill or assault?”71 each man who 
wishes to answer positively needs to come back to the beginning of their 
deliberations and get rid of the uncritical faith in abstractly comprehended 
moral values. only the rejection of an ideological division into good and evil 
is able to safeguard an individual from the trap of a series of justifications 
for their actions. only when the premise of the lack of possibility regarding 
the existence of justification for murder is set can real order based on justice 
be built. Camus seems to warn here against the sacrifice of one’s life for the 
sake of a supreme principle, which can lead to its own contradiction when 
comprehended abstractly and perceived solely theoretically.
in the set of essays Neither Victims nor Executioners, Camus states ultimately 
that each attempt to unify the world poses a danger of violence being imple-
mented – someone always proves to be stronger.72 such danger can be avoided 
only by dialogue held between contradictory sides of the dispute, which makes 
it possible to avoid the vicious circle of such reasoning that can reflect upon 
overuses. The pure concept of justice demands power, victims and execution-
ers for its existence. The only remedy for such a condition is to divert justice 
from its absolute understanding, leading to the possibility of saving human life.
COnCluSIOnS
Abstract considerations regarding justice have led to the philosophical justifi-
cation of violence, which Camus discerned in the pro-Marxist attitude of the 
intellectuals of post-liberation France.73 The critics of deliberations encompassed 
70 A. Camus, the editorial of november 29th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
s. 271.
71 A. Camus, the editorial of november 19th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 259.
72 A. Camus, the editorial of november 26th, 1946 [in:] Camus at Combat: Writing 1944–1947…, 
p. 267.
73 see: R. Aronson, Camus and Sartre, The story of a friendship and the quarrel that ended it, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press 2005, p. 115–127.
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in such works as Humanism and Terror by Merleau-Ponty or Materialism and 
Revolution by sartre enabled Camus to pay close attention to the crucial aspect 
of the problem of justice: its absolute form can entail the justification of murder. 
each attempt to draw any limit ends up in automatically placing someone in the 
role of an arbiter, who would impose such a border authoritatively. However, 
who is going to be that judge? And what if a mistake is made? Camus seems 
to remind us in Neither Victims nor Executioners of such fundamental ques-
tions which simply cannot be answered. each person who performs such a role 
contravenes the assumptions of justice, which needs, above all, dialogue for its 
existence. But only the construction of a discourse deprived of any previous 
emotional biases is able to lead to distinct conclusions.
A query thus emerges: it is viable to leave emotions aside in the face of 
extreme events? The history of post-occupation France reveals the answer: it 
is highly difficult. Camus urges therefore putting another value on a pedestal 
which would be, firstly, free from such emotional attitude and secondly, would 
have clear and obvious borders. only then would grounds for the elimina-
tion of all overuses would be given. This value would be the life of a person.
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